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Separation of duties (SoD) is a key security 
requirement for many business and information 
systems. Role Based Access Controls (RBAC) is a 
relatively new paradigm for protecting information 
systems. In the ANSI standard RBAC model both static 
and dynamic SoD are defined. However, static SoD 
policies assume that the system has full control over 
the assignment of all roles to users, whilst dynamic 
SoD policies assume that conflicts of interest can only 
arise during the simultaneous activation of a user’s 
roles. Unfortunately neither of these assumptions hold 
true in dynamic virtual organisations (VOs), or in 
business processes that span multiple user sessions, or 
where users only partially disclose their roles at each 
session. In this paper we propose multi-session SoD 
(MSoD) policies for business processes which include 
multiple tasks enacted by multiple users over many 
user access control sessions. We explore the means to 
define MSoD policies in RBAC via multi-session 
mutually exclusive roles (MMER) and multi-session 
mutually exclusive privileges (MMEP). We propose an 
approach to expressing MSoD policies in XML and 
enforcing MSoD policies in a policy controlled RBAC 
infrastructure. Finally, we describe how we have 





Separation of duties (SoD) is widely considered to 
be a fundamental security principle for business and 
information systems [1]. The concept of SoD has long 
existed in the physical world. For example, staff 
members in a bank are assigned to different posts with 
different duties. This ensures that cooperation of 
multiple staff members is required to perform all the 
tasks of a complete business process, either 
sequentially or concurrently, so that accountability can 
be enforced and damage caused by either a single 
member’s mistake, or an accident or deception can be 
avoided or minimized. Many organizations require that 
the request and approval of a major expenditure be 
done by two separate people. SoD is an important 
protection mechanism for handling important business 
processes or information, and it should be integrated 
with all access control mechanisms, such as 
discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access 
control (MAC), and especially role based access 
control (RBAC) since most tasks within organizations 
are performed by roles. 
Significant research about the use of SoD policies in 
RBAC has been performed and this is reflected in the 
ANSI standard [2]. The ANSI standard considers SoD 
as constraints on the roles that can be assigned to users 
at any time (Static SoD - SSD) or constraints on the 
roles that a user can activate simultaneously within one 
or more user sessions (Dynamic SoD - DSD). The 
ANSI standard assumes that static SoD policies can be 
enforced by the administrative function at role 
assignment time because the administrative system has 
full control over the assignment of all roles to users, 
whilst dynamic SoD policies can be enforced at role 
activation time because conflicts of interest can only 
arise when a user’s conflicting roles are active at the 
same time. 
Unfortunately neither of these assumptions hold 
true in all business environments. In dynamic virtual 
organisations (VOs) when multiple independent role 
allocating authorities exist, SSD cannot be enforced at 
role assignment time since no single administrative 
function will know all the roles that have already been 
assigned to any single user. In business processes 
where conflicts of interest exist over extended periods 
of time, during which a user may have invoked and 
terminated multiple access control sessions, DSD 
cannot be enforced at role activation time because a 
user may never activate conflicting roles 
simultaneously. When a user only partially discloses 
his roles at each session, the standard RBAC policy 
constraints cannot solve the SSD or DSD problems. In 
both these cases the current access control decision 
may depend on previous access control decisions that 
took place in some previous user access control 
session. Hence the access control system needs to 
retain a history of previous access control decisions.  
In Section 2 we analyze multi-session SoD (MSoD) 
policies in RBAC and propose multi-session mutually 
exclusive roles (MMER) and multi-session mutually 
exclusive privileges (MMEP) to enforce MSoD 
policies. In section 3 we propose a way of expressing 
MSoD policies in XML. In Section 4 we describe the 
enforcement procedure for MSoD policies in an RBAC 
system. In Section 5, we give a practical example of 
how we have integrated MSoD policies into the 
PERMIS [11] RBAC authorization infrastructure. 
Finally, in Section 6, we review related research, give 
the limitations of our research, and provide our 
conclusions. But first we give two motivating 
examples of SoD policies, one SSD and one DSD, in 
which the different tasks may be carried out in 
different user access control sessions by different roles. 
These will be used throughout the paper to highlight 
the concepts and designs that we have chosen. 
Example 1. Cash processing in a bank. In a bank, 
a staff member who is authorized to be a Teller may 
not be allowed to be an Auditor of the same bank. That 
is, an employee cannot simultaneously hold the roles 
of auditor and teller. However, some auditing, e.g. an 
annual one, may take place much later than the cash 
handling, during which time many staff may have 
changed their roles, and a cashier might have been 
promoted to an auditor. This is an example of a SSD 
policy over multiple user sessions with potentially 
many role occupant changes during the operation of 
the policy. Obviously a conventional SSD policy 
cannot express such a constraint since no user might 
ever have been assigned the conflicting roles at the 
same period of time and so the conventional SSD 
policy will never have been violated. 
Example 2. Tax refund taken from [12]. To carry 
out a tax refund process, four different tasks need to be 
executed sequentially: 
Task T1: A clerk prepares a check for a tax refund. 
Task T2: A manager can approve or disapprove the 
check. This task should be performed in parallel twice 
by two different managers.  
Task T3: The decisions of the managers are collected 
and the final decision is made. The manager who 
collects the results must be different from those 
executing task T2. 
Task T4: A clerk issues or voids the check based on the 
result of task T3; the clerk issuing or voiding the check 
must be different from the clerk who prepared the 
check. 
This is an example of DSD which conventional 
RBAC policies cannot specify because a user may 
activate the manager or clerk role only, but this does 
not violate the conventional DSD policy. Whilst a 
manager (or clerk) is authorized to perform several 
tasks, in this example he may only perform one of 
them in one tax refund process instance. Furthermore, 
one tax refund process instance might span multiple 
user sessions, so a manager (or clerk) who has 
performed a task in an earlier session may not be 
authorised to perform any task in a subsequent session. 
Since the DSD policy must span several tasks over a 
period of time, and may involve different user sessions, 
then traditional RBAC DSD cannot work in this 
scenario because it only controls the simultaneous 
activation of user roles. Bertino et al solved the DSD 
problem in this workflow environment [12], but their 
solution only works in a centralised homogeneous 
system and is integrated with the workflow system. In 
this paper, we will provide a solution which can deal 
with DSD in a multi-session distributed heterogeneous 
environment that is not tied to workflows. 
 
2. Multi-session separation of duty (MSoD) 
 
2.1. Static and dynamic SoD in the standard 
RBAC model 
 
In its simplest form, a SoD policy states that if a 
sensitive business process is comprised of two tasks, 
then different people must perform each task. More 
generally, when a business process is comprised of n 
tasks, a SoD policy requires the cooperation of at least 
k (1< k ≤ n) different users to complete the process. 
The purpose of separation of duties is to prevent one 
person from doing all the tasks of a sensitive process 
that should require two or more people in order to 
prevent mistakes or fraud. 
RBAC is perceived to be one of the most efficient 
and flexible approaches to enforcing security policies 
in industrial and commercial application systems. 
Privilege management in RBAC [2] is described in 
terms of users, roles, operations, and objects (Figure 
1). Users are assigned to roles in a many to many 
relationship. If a user is a person, a role can represent a 
job function, a qualification or expertise. Privileges 
(termed permissions in ANSI RBAC [2]) represent the 
right to perform an operation on an object, and are 
granted to different roles in a many to many 
relationship. A user may have multiple roles but 
activates only a subset of these within any user access 
control session. A user must be active in a role before 
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Figure 1. The ANSI RBAC Model 
 
If a user is not allowed to be assigned conflicting 
roles according to the role assignment policy, this is a 
SSD policy. For example, in a bank, normally a staff 
member is not allowed to hold both the teller and 
auditor’s roles at the same time (Example 1). If on the 
other hand, a user is allowed to hold but not to 
simultaneously activate conflicting roles (in one or 
more user sessions) this is a DSD policy. Standard 
RBAC can only provide a solution to the DSD problem 
described in Example 2 above by artificially defining 
different roles for each of the five tasks. 
The above two types of SoD policy ultimately 
control the roles a user may activate simultaneously (in 
one or more sessions) and so they are not sufficient to 
satisfy SoD requirements for more complex situations 
in either a process environment or a multi domain 
RBAC system. In a multiple domain scenario, e.g. a 
virtual organization (VO), where the user roles are 
assigned by multiple authorities and used to access 
resources in different domains, a user may be assigned 
different roles by different domain administrators and 
no single RBAC system may know the full set of a 
user’s roles. So if a user is assigned two conflicting 
roles (conflicting according to the SoD policy of the 
resource domain) by two different administrative 
domain authorities, but he presents only one role each 
time to the resource he wishes to access, then his 
access requests will not be against either the static or 
dynamic SoD policies of the resource domain. To cater 
for this type of security situation, we need a new SoD 
policy which we call a multi-session SoD (MSoD) 
policy, which can be associated with the multiple 
temporal user access control sessions, i.e. access 
control decisions in the current session may depend on 
accesses that were granted earlier in time in previous 
sessions. Thus the user who activates and utilises a role 
in one session will be forbidden to activate the 
conflicting role(s) in subsequent later sessions. For the 
bank cash processing example, the MSoD policy can 
state that, if a person has ever acted as a Teller (or an 
Auditor) before some event such as the annual audit, 
then he will no longer be authorized to activate the role 
of Auditor (or a Teller) now. Thus a current access 
control decision will depend upon earlier decisions in 
previous user access control sessions. 
 
2.2. Business context of MSoD 
 
Whilst MSoD policies implicitly concern multiple 
temporal user sessions, the scope of an MSoD policy is 
not bound to any particular set of user sessions. Some 
MSoD policies may apply for a long period of time, 
e.g. for a year, or for as long as a VO persists; but other 
MSoD policies may only apply for the execution of a 
business process instance, such as the tax refund in 
Example 2. In that example, the MSoD policy needs to 
state that, for a tax refund process instance, if a clerk 
has been authorized to do Task 1, then he/she will no 
longer be authorized to do Task 4, regardless of 
whether it is in the same user session or not. Note that 
this MSoD policy only restricts the clerk’s access 
requests within a business process instance; the same 
clerk is authorized to do either Task 1 or Task 4 in a 
different tax refund process instance within the same or 
a different user session. In both cases, the history of 
prior access control decisions in the same or previous 
user sessions is needed in order to make the correct 
current decision. 
In order to determine the scope of an MSoD policy, 
we introduce the concept of a business context. The 
scope of an MSoD policy is specified by reference to a 
business context, rather than to user sessions. A 
business context (and hence an MSoD policy) may 
span multiple user sessions, or a user session may span 
several business contexts. In this way we remove 
MSoD policies from any dependency on user sessions, 
and put the dependency back where it belongs, in the 
business context for which the separation of duties 
applies.  
A business context is therefore the set of business 
processes throughout which an MSoD policy must 
persist. An MSoD policy can apply across all the 
instances of a business context or to each separate 
instance of a business context. The former is equivalent 
to SSD within a business context, the latter to DSD 
within a business context instance. For example, an 
MSoD policy for the business context of issuing 
cheques, may say either that one group of people must 
complete the amounts on cheques and a different group 
sign the cheques (i.e. SSD across all business context 
instances) or different people must complete and sign 
the same cheque (i.e. DSD per business context 
instance). We propose that all business contexts are 
related together in a context hierarchy. The most 
generic business context is the universal context for an 
organization (or VO), and this contains all the business 
processes carried out by that organization (or VO). The 
most refined business context is a business process that 
contains at least 2 tasks that have separation of duties 
constraints (as in Example 1), or 1 task that cannot be 
repeated by the same person (as in task T2 of Example 
2).  The mechanism we use to relate one business 
context to another is by hierarchically naming them, 
using a set of type-value pairs, where type is the 
business context and value is an instance of the 
context. The universal context forms the root of this 
context hierarchy and its name is null. Consequently, 
there can only be one active instance of the universal 
context of an organization (or VO) at any point in time, 
but subordinate contexts can have multiple active 
instances at any time.  
When writing MSoD policies we need to be able to 
specify both SSD across all instances of a business 
context and DSD per business context instance. We use 
the value notation * to signify the former, and ! to 
signify the latter. In Example 1 the MSoD policy 
applies to the entire bank (the universal context) across 
all its branches for each period of an audit, and so the 
business context may be referred to in the MSoD 
policy as “Branch=*, Period=!” (see Figure 2). If 
instead the MSoD policy had applied to each separate 
branch of the bank (meaning that an employee could be 
a teller in one branch and an auditor in another branch), 
then the policy business context for the bank might be 
referred to as “Branch=!, Period=!”. If the policy had 
applied only to the York branch, the policy business 
context might be named “Branch=York, Period=!”.  
 
Figure 2. Various Policy Business Contexts 
applied to a Business Context Instance 
Hierarchy 
If an organization (or VO) needs to enforce MSoD 
policies across two sequential business processes, e.g. 
cash dispensing followed by cash reconciliation, then 
there is always a super-context that joins them together 
e.g. cash processing (i.e. there is some super-goal that 
the organization wants to achieve) since all business 
contexts for an organization (or VO) are always part of 
the same universal hierarchy. Note that knowledge of 
how the different business contexts relate together 
within the hierarchy is part of the application schema 
that stores the hierarchy of contexts. The security 
policy and access control system do not need to know 
this. The security policy contains sufficient knowledge 
of how two or more business contexts relate to each 
other via the hierarchical names of each context. 
When evaluating an MSoD policy, the access 
control system needs to know which particular 
business context is currently active. Consequently we 
propose that each access control request carries the 
value of the current business context instance. This is 
sufficient for the access control system to evaluate the 
MSoD policy (see Section 4). But it is not the most 
efficient method of evaluation since a large amount of 
unnecessary history information will need to be 
retained by the access control system. Consequently 
we propose that an MSoD policy optionally contains 
the starting task and ending task of a business context, 
to indicate during which part of the business process 
the context is active from an MSoD perspective, and 
during which time history information needs to be 
retained. If the starting and ending tasks are missing 
from the policy, the access control system must record 
history information for each instance of an active 
business context from either the first time an instance 
is mentioned or the system can infer it has started 
(because a contained business context has started), 
until either the system can infer that the instance has 
finished (because a containing business context 
completes, or no longer exists), or management 
procedures delete the history information. 
 
2.3. Multi-session mutually exclusive roles 
 
A convenient way to specify SoD policies in RBAC 
is by defining mutually exclusive roles (MER). In the 
RBAC standard model [2], a MER constraint forbids a 
user from holding (SSD) or activating (DSD) m from n 
(n ≥ m ) (n ≥ 2) different roles (r1, r2, …,rn) at the 
same time, so as to enforce a SoD policy. For a set of 
n SoD roles (n ≥ 2), a MER constraint can be 
expressed as m-out-of-n mutually exclusive roles: 
MER({r1,…,rn}, m), where each ri is a role, n and m are 
integers, 1 < m ≤ n. A MER constraint defines a set of 
conflicting roles in an organization, for example 
MER({teller, auditor}, 2) will forbid a user from 
possessing or activating 2 conflicting roles in the SoD 
role set. Whilst separation of duties is the security 
objective and a SoD policy defines which duties must 
 
be separate, MER is a constraint imposed on users’ 
roles in an RBAC system as a means of implementing 
SoD policies. MER obviously fails when it is not 
known how many roles a user possesses and the user 
chooses to selectively activate different roles in 
different sessions, or when there are constraints on 
what tasks a role can perform which depend upon the 
previous tasks already undertaken by the user. 
To express and implement MSoD, we propose a 
new type of role constraint, which we call multi-
session mutually exclusive roles (MMER). A MMER 
constraint can be denoted as an m-out-of-n constraint, 
which contains n MSoD roles in which m or more are 
conflicting with each other and cannot be activated by 
a user in a particular business context.  
For each ri (i=1, .. n) MSoD roles (n ≥ 2), a MMER 
rule can be expressed as a set of n MSoD roles with a 
forbidden role cardinality m: 
MMER({r1,…,rn}, m, BC)  
where BC identifies the particular (hierarchically 
named) business context to which the m mutually 
exclusive roles apply, in which each ri (i=1, .. n, n≥2) 
is a role, and 1 < m ≤ n. In this case, a user is forbidden 
to activate m or more roles among {r1,…,rn} in the 
same business context [instance], so as to enforce an 
MSoD policy. For the cash processing example, Teller 
and Auditor are mutually exclusive within the bank in 
any auditing period, so the policy can be denoted as 
MMER({Teller, Auditor}, 2, “Branch=*, Period=!”). 
Since contexts are hierarchically related, all contexts 
which are equal or subordinate to the context in the 
MMER rule should be applied with the MMER rule. 
 
2.4. Multi-session mutually exclusive privileges 
 
To achieve more flexible and finer grained access 
controls and MSoD, only part of the privileges (i.e. 
operations on certain targets) granted to a role can be 
made mutually exclusive. E.g. in example 2, the role of 
a manager can have both the privileges of 
approving/disapproving a tax refund application and 
summarizing tax refund decisions. But 
approving/disapproving a tax refund application and 
summarizing tax refund decisions for the same tax 
refund application are two mutually exclusive 
privileges, so the user who has the role of a manager 
should not be allowed to perform both Tasks T2 and 
T3 for the same tax refund process instance. 
Furthermore, Task T2 needs to be performed twice, 
and any manager should only perform this task once. 
Mutually exclusive privileges for a process instance are 
called multi-session mutually exclusive privileges 
(MMEP) in this paper. 
MMEP constraints are defined as follows. For n 
MSoD privileges (n ≥ 2), a MMEP constraint can be 
expressed as a set of n MSoD privileges with a 
forbidden privilege cardinality m: 
MMEP({p1,…,pn}, m, BC) 
where BC is the business context [instance] containing 
the m mutually exclusive privileges pi (i = 1, .. n), 
where 1 < m ≤ n. In this case, a user is forbidden to 
perform m or more privileges among {p1,…, pn } in the 
same business context [instance]. For the tax refund 
example, approving/disapproving a tax refund 
application (p1) and summarizing tax refund decisions 
(p2) are two mutually exclusive privileges in any 
single instance. We may denote this as MMEP({p1, 
p2}, 2, “…., taxRefundProcess=!”). (Note. Each 
privilege will be expressed as an operation and 
associated object in a complete policy).  A manager is 
also forbidden from exercising the same 
approving/disapproving tax refund privilege (p1) more 
than once, so this privilege is also mutually exclusive. 
We can denote this as MMEP({p1, p1}, 2, “…., 
taxRefundProcess=!”).  
 
 3. MSoD policies in XML  
 
Many modern day access control policies are now 
being written in XML e.g. XACML [7], X-Sec [14], 
PERMIS [11] and Akenti [6]. In this section we 
describe a generic XML MSoD policy for RBAC 
systems based on MMER and MMEP constraints. The 
business context is identified by its unique hierarchical 
name, and optionally by its first and last steps 
(Operations on Objects i.e. tasks) that are subject to the 
MSoD constraints. The first step tells the policy 
decision point (PDP) when to start enforcing MSoD 
and the last step when to stop enforcing it, for each 
business context [instance]. If the first step is omitted, 
the PDP must start to enforce MSoD from whatever is 
the first operation that is invoked inside the business 
context [instance] or any contained context [instance]. 
If the last step is omitted, the PDP may infer that a 
business context is no longer active if a containing 
business context [instance] is terminated (since all the 
contained ones must also be terminated). Otherwise 
termination of the MSoD policy enforcement must be 
done by administrative means. We suggest how this 
can be implemented in section 4.3. One or more 
MMER and/or MMEP constraints can be listed for 
each MSoD policy. The MMEP (MMER) constraints 
contain sufficient information for the PDP to know if 
two or more task steps (roles) are conflicting for the 
particular business context instance. The MSoD 
policies for the two examples – bank cash processing 
and tax refund process, are as follows. 
 
<MSoDPolicySet> 
<MSoDPolicy  BusinessContext=“Branch=*, Period=!”>   
<!-- policy applies for each instance of period across all 
branches of the bank --> 
     <LastStep operation=“CommitAudit”  
targetURI=“http://audit.location.com/audit”/> 
     <MMER  ForbiddenCardinality = “2”> 
<Role type=”employee” value=”Teller”/> 
<Role type=”employee” value=”Auditor”/> 
</MMER> 
</MSoDPolicy> 
 <MSoDPolicy  BusinessContext=“TaxOffice=!, 
taxRefundProcess=!” />  
<!-- policy applies for each instance of taxRefundProcess 
in each tax office --> 
    <FirstStep operation= “prepareCheck” 
targetURI=“http://www.myTaxOffice.com/Check”/> 
    <LastStep operation=”confirmCheck” 
targetURI=“http://secret.location.com/audit”/> 
    <MMEP ForbiddenCardinality= “2”> 
<Operation value= “prepareCheck” 
target=“http://www.myTaxOffice.com/Check”/> 
<Operation value= “confirmCheck” 
target=“http://secret.location.com/audit”/> 
     </MMEP> 
     <MMEP ForbiddenCardinality= “2”> 
<Operation value= “approve/disapproveCheck”          
target=“http://www.myTaxOffice.com/Check”/> 








In the first example, the business context is every 
audit period across the entire bank. The first step of the 
business context is missing, meaning that the PDP will 
start to enforce MMER as soon as any operation in any 
period is invoked that contains this or any subordinate 
business context. This will forbid any user to invoke 
both Auditor and Teller roles until CommitAudit is 
invoked in the same period, regardless of which branch 
the operation was invoked in. After auditing has been 
completed, and the CommitAudit operation is invoked, 
MMER enforcement for this business context instance 
is finished, and the history information is deleted.  
In the second example, the mutually exclusive 
privilege constraints contain the same privilege 
(approve/disapproveCheck) twice, which means that a 
user is only allowed to perform this privilege at most 
once in each context instance. 
 
4. Enforcement of MSoD policies 
 
4.1. Access control framework for MSoD 
enforcement  
 
A standard RBAC system knows all the roles 
assigned to each user, therefore SoD constraints can be 
imposed either at the role assignment stage when roles 
are being assigned to users, or at the role activation 
stage when roles are being activated for a user session, 
as depicted in Figure 1. Since MSoD constraints are 
associated with multiple tasks in business contexts that 
span multiple user sessions, and/or user roles that are 
allocated by multiple domain authorities, enforcement 
of MSoD constraints is only possible at the access 
control decision making stage. This requires the 
current access control decision to be dependent upon 
the previous access control decisions for the same 
business context. The ISO Access Control Framework 
[13] has this feature built into its model. To make 
history dependent access control decisions, a Retained 
Access control Decision Information (ADI) component 
is specified. The Retained ADI is responsible for 
recording and maintaining information about all 
previous access control decisions, so that current 
decisions made by the Access control Decision 
Function (ADF) – the ISO term for the Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) – can properly take into account policy 















Figure 3. Access control framework from ISO   
    10181-3 with the Retained ADI 
 
Normally the following information needs to be 
passed from the Access control Enforcement Function 
(AEF) – the ISO term for the Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP) – to the ADF/PDP in order to make an RBAC 
decision for a user: 1) the user’s attributes/roles 
(optionally including the user’s ID), 2) the requested 
operation and its parameters, 3) the requested target 
object (identified by a set of attributes) and 4) any 
environmental or contextual information such as the 
time of day.  
In order to make multi-session access control 
decisions, the user’s ID becomes mandatory so that the 
ADF/PDP can link together the user’s sessions. We 
also require 5) the business context instance so that the 
ADF/PDP can determine which MSoD policy applies. 
Conceptually, the business context instance could be 
regarded as part of the contextual information, but we 
prefer to keep it as a separate parameter because 
special matching rules apply to it (see later). The PEP, 
being part of the application, is easily able to identify 
the business context instance of each user request1. 
Based on all these access request parameters, and the 
information from previous access control sessions 
stored in the retained ADI, MSoD policies can now be 
enforced by the PDP. 
 
4.2 MSoD policy enforcement procedure  
 
MSoD policies are a component of RBAC policies. 
When a PDP first initialises, it must read in the RBAC 
policy including the MSoD component. It also needs to 
initialise the retained ADI from previous sessions. The 
retained ADI is conceptually secure stable storage 
holding previous access control decisions, and this can 
be implemented in a variety of ways e.g. an encrypted 
secure database, or a tamperproof audit trail such as 
[5]. When the PDP initializes, it needs to reconstruct 
the retained ADI from this physically secure stable 
storage. For MSoD, each record in the retained ADI 
needs to contain 1) user’s ID, 2) user’s activated 
role(s), 3) operation granted, 4) target accessed, 5) 
business context instance, and 6) time/date of grant 
decision. The latter parameter is needed for 
administrative purposes (see later). 
As shown in Figure 3, when the PEP requests the 
PDP to make an access control decision, the 5 sets of 
parameters mentioned in 4.1 above are passed from the 
PEP to the PDP. The PDP first performs its normal 
checking against the RBAC policy, and if the interim 
result is grant, then the PDP will further perform the 
following algorithm to check each user’s access 
request against the MSoD set of policies. Input to the 
algorithm comprises the user’s ID, user’s activated 
role(s), operation granted, target to be accessed and 
business context instance name. The return value is 
unaltered or set to Deny access. 
1) Match the input business context instance against 
the business contexts in the MSoD set of policies. If 
there is no match EXIT. (Matching is based on the 
context naming hierarchy. If the input context 
instance is equal to or subordinate to any of the 
contexts in the set of MSoD policies, then a match 
                                                        
1
 The policy writer also needs to know what the business contexts 
are in order to construct a correct policy, but this is no different from 
the current requirement of needing to know the correct operations, 
targets, roles etc. 
with a policy business context is flagged2. If there 
are multiple matches then all policies apply and are 
selected.) If a matched policy pertains to a single 
business context instance (!), replace policy 
business context with the instance of the input 
business context.  
2) For each matched MSoD policy do the following. 
When no more, EXIT. 
3) Match the policy business context against the 
business context instances stored in the retained 
ADI. (Retained ADI context instance matches if it is 
equal or subordinate to policy context, noting that 
policy context of * matches all instance values.) If 
there are one or more matches goto 5). 
4) Check if the requested operation is the first step in 
the matched policy business context. If it is, or if 
there is no first step in the policy, add a new entry to 
the retainedADIlist then goto 7). 
5) For each MMER in the policy, do 
i. Match activated role(s) against MMER 
role(s). Number of matched roles = n
r
 
ii. If no match goto next MMER. 
iii. Ignoring n
r
 current matched role(s) in 
MMER, count number of remaining roles 
in the MMER that match roles from 
retained ADI for this user ID and matched 
policy business context.  





 new records to retainedADIlist for 
activated role(s) and goto next MMER, else 
set DENY and EXIT. 
6) For each MMEP in the policy, do 
i. Match requested operation and target against 
MMEP privilege(s). 
ii. If no match goto next MMEP. 
iii. Ignoring current matched operation and target 
in MMEP, count number of remaining 
operation and targets in the MMEP that match 
an operation and target from retained ADI for 
this user ID and matched policy business 
context. If count LT (ForbiddenCardinality-1) 
add a new record to retainedADIlist for 
current operation and target and goto next 
MMEP, else set DENY and EXIT. 
7) If requested operation equals last step for this 
MSoD policy business context (i.e. business 
context is terminated), then delete every record 
from retained ADI that has a matching business 
context instance (i.e. equal or subordinate to 
policy business context), else store 
retainedADIlist in retained ADI. 
                                                        
2
 Note that we do not need to be concerned with business contexts 
that are superior to ones in the MSoD policy, since their absence 
from the policy means that there are no constraints at this higher 
level. 
8) Goto 2). 
Note that if the access request is denied, then no 
change needs to be made to the retained ADI database, 
as it has no effect on future RBAC with MSoD 
decisions. Only granted decisions are stored in the 
retained ADI. 
 
4.3. Explicit management of the retained ADI  
 
The retained ADI is a core component for 
implementing MSoD in an RBAC PDP. Entries for a 
business context instance are added to the retained ADI 
after the first step of the business context is initiated, 
and they are removed from the retained ADI after the 
last step of the business context has finished. Providing 
the policy contains the last step of a business context, 
or it can be implied, then no administrative 
management of the retained ADI is needed. But for 
cases where a business context has no defined or 
implied last step, then a control mechanism is needed 
to manage the retained ADI, otherwise it will get too 
large and performance will be degraded. (Note that 
there are no security implications from not purging the 
retained ADI, only performance implications.) We 
propose that a management port on the PDP can be 
used to manage the retained ADI, by treating the 
retained ADI as a target resource that only trusted 
administrators are allowed to access via the PDP’s 
management port. We can securely maintain the 
retained ADI, by defining an RBAC policy to protect 
it. A new role of say “RetainedADIController” is 
created with privileges to perform some operations on 
the retained ADI such as “remove record” or “purge”. 
We plan to implement this feature next. 
 
5. Implementation of MSoD in PERMIS 
 
PERMIS is a Privilege Management Infrastructure 
whose core component is an RBAC decision making 
PDP [11]. Here we show how MSoD policies have 
been implemented in PERMIS. 
 
5.1. Structure of PERMIS  
 
The PERMIS infrastructure comprises three sub-
systems: a privilege allocation (PA) sub-system for 
allocating roles to users, a policy management sub-
system for creating RBAC policies, and a credential 
verification service/policy decision point (CVS/PDP) 
sub-system for granting or denying user’s access to 
resources. We are primarily concerned with the latter 
in this paper. User’s roles and attributes are typically 
stored in one or more LDAP directories. They are 
usually transported as digitally signed credentials, 
encoded as either SAML assertions [19] or X.509 
attribute certificates [20]. The function of the CVS is to 
validate these credentials and extract the valid roles 
and attributes from them, so that the PDP can make an 
access control decision. It is at this point that MSoD 
policies can be imposed by the PDP. The PERMIS 
CVS/PDP sub-system structure is shown in Figure 4. 





Every time an access control decision request is 
passed to the PERMIS PDP, the request and the 
response are logged in a secure audit trail [5]. This 
creates a cryptographically protected log of events in 
stable storage. Any granted decision that involves an 
MSoD policy is stored as retained ADI in memory as 
the 6 tuple defined in Section 4.2, as well as in the 
secure audit trail. When a granted last step is recorded 
in the audit trail, the retained ADI records for that 
business context instance and any subordinate 
instances are flushed from memory (but not from the 
audit trail). At start up, the PDP reads in its policy, and 
then processes the last n audit trails starting from time t 
(where t and n are administrative parameters). It 
extracts the retained ADI from these according to its 
current set of MSoD policies. Once its retained ADI is 
recovered to memory, the PDP is ready to start making 
access control decisions again. 
By adding the business context instance to the list 
of environmental parameters that are already passed to 
the PERMIS PDP, we have not needed to alter the Java 
API to PERMIS in order to support multiple session 
separation of duties policies. The code is expected to 
be publicly released as open source via the US NMI 
release [17] in 2007. 
 
6. Related Work, Limitations and 
Conclusions 
 
SoD has been widely studied by many researchers. 
Sandhu [4] presented one of the earliest papers to 
explicitly identify SoD as an issue in business 
transactions. His work predated that on RBAC, and his 
solution used a history based transaction control model 
and expressed SoD rules by assigning conflicting tasks 
to differently named roles in order to avoid collusion or 
conflict of interest. The expression and enforcement of 
the transaction control model and the SoD rules are 
application specific and authorization for SoD is based 
on users’ identities, not on roles – i.e. users with 
different user identities are required to execute 
conflicting tasks, so it is not based on RBAC, and does 
not form part of a generic RBAC model. In contrast we 
have provided an RBAC mechanism for SoD, and we 
have expressed the SoD rules as a generic RBAC sub 
policy in XML, whilst authorization is based on users’ 
roles, not on their identities (although SoD 
enforcement is based on their identities). 
Kuhn [3] discussed mutual exclusion of roles for 
SoD and analyzed the properties of different situations 
of mutually exclusive roles – partial and complete 
exclusion, authorization-time and run-time exclusion. 
But Kuhn’s work is only on static and dynamic SoD, it 
doesn’t solve the problem in a business process 
environment when authorization spans multiple user 
sessions. In contrast, our work has solved the multi-
session SoD problem in RBAC. 
Simon and Zurko [8] proposed SoD policies in a 
role-based environment in the form of condition rules. 
They also discussed the concept of history based SoD, 
but no XML policy was discussed nor how the rules 
could be integrated with RBAC policies. Finally no 
enforcement or implementation mechanism was 
discussed.  
Gligor et al. [9] discussed SoD policies in RBAC 
and gave formalized expressions of SoD policies in 
different situations – Static SoD, Dynamic SoD, 
Object-based Static SoD, Object-based Dynamic SoD, 
Operational Dynamic SoD, History based Dynamic 
SoD, etc. Their work provides an excellent 
formalization of SoD policies at the conceptual level. 
But business process contexts are not explicitly 
expressed in their work, and no XML policy was 
presented. Finally no enforcement or implementation 
mechanism of SoD in RBAC was discussed in their 
work.  
Ahn et al. proposed a constraint language – RCL 
2000 (Role based Constraint Language 2000), to 
support role-based SoD constraints in RBAC [10], and 
static and dynamic SoD can be supported by their 
language. But RCL 2000 is a proprietary notation, and 
it needs to be further extended to support history based 
SoD. Finally, no enforcement mechanism for 
applications was presented in their work.  
In [18], Crampton treated SoD in RBAC systems. 
He analyzed different types of separation of duty as 
user based separation (no role in a specified set can be 
assigned to a set of users), role-based (no user should 
be assigned a set of roles), permission-based, and 
object-based. Compared to this taxonomy, our work 
focuses on role-based and permission-based SoD. 
Crampton proposes to enforce SoD via an anti-role. As 
a role is associated with a set of permissions, an anti-
role is associated with a set of prohibitions that 
constitute a blacklist for each user. Crampton proposes 
that implementations should periodically purge the 
assignments of sanitized permissions, thus deleting the 
anti-role effect. In comparison we have proposed a 
better solution using the business context to define the 
scope of an MSoD policy, and deletion of the retained 
ADI only after a business context has terminated.  
In [12] Bertino et al propose a solution for SoD in 
workflow applications that is not history based, but 
rather computes the set of all possible role and user 
assignments that dont violate the SoD policy and other 
constraints, prior to workflow commencing. Then 
when a user asks to activate a role, it checks if this is 
possible, and after the task finishes prunes the rules to 
make future evaluations faster. However the solution is 
based on a central authority that knows all the users, 
roles and user role assignments whilst our solution 
does not have this restriction and can work in a 
distributed environment. Bertino’s solution focuses 
solely on SoD within workflows and requires prior 
specification and knowledge of the workflow and its 
tasks. In contrast our approach does not require 
knowledge of all (or any of) the workflow tasks. 
Furthermore some examples of SoD are not related to 
workflows, as in Example 1. Our approach can cater 
for this whilst Bertino’s cannot. 
Our work is not without its limitations though. 
Firstly, the PDP needs to know the name or ID of the 
user who has activated the roles, in order to link the 
different access control sessions of the user together. In 
a pure RBAC system the PDP does not need to know 
the name of the user, and can make access control 
decisions based solely on the user’s roles. The original 
PERMIS PDP can do this, but the MSoD PERMIS 
PDP needs the user’s ID in order to enforce multiple 
session SoD. Secondly, we have assumed that the user 
will have the same ID for each session, and that each 
role or attribute is linked to the same user ID. The first 
assumption does not always hold true, for example, in 
Shibboleth [15] a user is given a different handle ID 
for each session. If this was the only ID ever delivered 
to the PDP it would not be possible to support MSoD 
with Shibboleth. However, it is possible to configure 
Shibboleth to return the user’s ID along with their 
other attributes, in which case MSoD can be supported. 
The second assumption does not always hold true 
either. In a multi-authority VO, each authority may use 
different identifiers for identifying the same user. The 
Liberty Alliance model [16] works on this basis. Thus 
a user could use one identity from one authority to 
activate one role e.g. clerk, and another identity from 
another authority to activate a second role e.g. auditor. 
Our MSoD procedure would not be able to detect this. 
However the Liberty Model supports identity linking 
between pairs of authorities, providing each service 
provider with a one way alias for identifying the same 
user in a different authority (even though it does not 
know the user’s true identity in each authority). In this 
way MSoD can be enforced by linking the user’s 
aliases to the local identity, and basing the MSoD 
policy on the local identity. Finally, we anticipate that 
our current implementation will not be scalable, due to 
the time taken to initialize the retained ADI from the 
secure audit trails. Thus our next implementation will 
use a secure relational database to store the retained 
ADI instead of in-core memory. Nevertheless the 
concepts and policies described in this paper will 
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Appendix A: The MSoD policy schema 




  <xs:element name="MSoDPolicySet"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:sequence> 
        <xs:element maxOccurs="unbounded" 
ref="MSoDPolicy"/> 
      </xs:sequence> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  <xs:element name="MSoDPolicy"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:sequence> 
        <xs:element ref="FirstStep" minOccurs="0" /> 
       <xs:element ref="LastStep" minOccurs="0" /> 
        <xs:choice> 
          <xs:element maxOccurs="unbounded" 
ref="MMER"/> 
          <xs:element maxOccurs="unbounded" 
ref="MMEP"/> 
        </xs:choice> 
      </xs:sequence> 
      <xs:attribute name="BusinessContext" 
use="required" type="xs:NCName"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  <xs:element name="FirstStep"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:attribute name="operation" use="required" 
type="xs:NCName"/> 
      <xs:attribute name="targetURI" use="required" 
type="xs:anyURI"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  <xs:element name="LastStep"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:attribute name="operation" use="required" 
type="xs:NCName"/> 
      <xs:attribute name="targetURI" use="required" 
type="xs:anyURI"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  <xs:element name="MMER"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:sequence> 
        <xs:element maxOccurs="unbounded" 
minOccurs= “2” ref="Role"/> 
      </xs:sequence> 
    <xs:attribute name="ForbiddenCardinality" 
use="required" type="xs:integer"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  <xs:element name="Role"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:attribute name="type" use="required" 
type="xs:NCName"/> 
      <xs:attribute name="value" use="required" 
type="xs:NCName"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  <xs:element name="MMEP"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:sequence> 
        <xs:element maxOccurs="unbounded" 
ref="Privilege"/> 
      </xs:sequence> 
    <xs:attribute name="ForbiddenCardinality" 
use="required" type="xs:integer"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  <xs:element name="Privilege"> 
    <xs:complexType> 
      <xs:attribute name="target" use="required" 
type="xs:anyURI"/> 
      <xs:attribute name="operation" use="required" 
type="xs:NCName"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
</xs:schema> 
 
